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Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Houston:
Public Has Limited Access to Criminal Records
After the city of Houston refused to release certain arrest records the
Houston Chronicle Publishing Company sought a declaratory judgment in
order to establish a statutory right of access to the documents under the
Texas Open Records Act. The trial court denied the relief sought and the
plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed: The media and the public have a limited
right to review information maintained by state law enforcement agencies.
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ filed).*
I. THE TExAS OPEN RECORDS ACT AND INVESTIGATORY FILES
Recognizing that the public should be entitled to full disclosure of the
affairs of state government, the Sixty-third Texas Legislature adopted the
Texas Open Records Act.1 The Act provides a comprehensive scheme for
public access to state documents. Fifteen classes of documents are termed
"public" 2 while sixteen categories are exempt from disclosure.8 Despite the
exempt categories, the legislature clearly expressed an intention that the
"Act shall be liberally construed in favor of the granting of any request for
information."'4
One exemption from public disclosure under the Texas Open Records Act
provides that "records of law enforcement agencies that deal with the detection
and investigation of crime" are not available for public review.5 According
to the author of the Act6 this section was modeled after a provision of the
Federal Freedom of Information Act.7 The primary purpose of the federal
* Editor's Note: After this Note was set in print the Texas Supreme Court, in a
per curiam opinion, refused application for writ of error, n.r.e. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
300 (April 28, 1976).
1. Tnx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Supp. 1975-76).
2. Id. § 6(a).
3. Id. § 3(a). The state judicial branch is not included within the purview of the
Texas Open Records Act. Id. § 2(1)(G).
4. Id. § 14(d). Upon written application by any person the custodian of the
requested document must promptly produce the record for inspection and duplication. Id.
§ 5(b). Governmental agencies are authorized to charge reasonable fees for access to
such records. Hendricks v. Board of Trustees, 525 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If a governmental unit determines that the
requested document is confidential, the agency may within 10 days request that the Texas
Attorney General resolve the dispute. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7a
(Supp. 1975-76). If no action is taken by the agency, the party desiring the record may
seek a writ of mandamus for a judicial determination of the issue. Id. § 8. According
to the court in Texas Indus. Accident Bd. v. Industrial Foundation of the South, 526
S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont, writ granted), the party seeking the
mandamus must enter the controversy with "clean hands."
5. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(8) (Supp. 1975-76). See
generally Comment, Texas Open Records Act: Law Enforcement Agencies' Investigatory
Records, 29 Sw. L.J. 431 (1975).
6. Texas State Representative Lane Denton addressing the Texas House of Repre-
sentatives on February 13, 1973. Transcripts on file with the Texas Legislative Counsel.
7. The federal act, as originally adopted, provided for the non-disclosure of
investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent the
information is available by law to a party other than an agency. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b) (7)
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law enforcement exception was to enhance the detection of federal statutory
violations8 and protect the privacy of citizens being investigated by9 or provid-
ing information to10 federal investigatory agencies. This exception, however,
cannot completely abrogate the media's right under the first amendment to
publish items of public interest" or the public's right to be informed of gov-
ernmental activities. 12 Courts have a duty to strike a workable balance
between these conflicting public policy precepts.' 3
II. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
In applying the law enforcement exemption of the Texas Open Records
Act the courts are faced with three basic policy considerations which are
firmly rooted in the traditions of our society: (1) the state's right to secrecy,
(2) the freedom of the press, and (3) the individual's right to privacy.
These policy considerations do not operate in a vacuum. Judicial decisions
often demonstrate that the state's right to secrecy or the individual's right
to privacy can conflict with the freedom of the press. For purposes of analy-
sis each concept is examined separately.
State Secrecy. As a practical matter government must operate behind closed
doors in certain limited circumstances. A common law privilege of govern-
mental confidentiality, therefore, has been recognized by the courts.' 4 In a
(1970). This section was recently amended by the 93d Congress, 2d Session. Act of
Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
(Supp. IV, 1974)). See also Comment, Amendment of the Seventh Exemption under the
Freedom of Information Act, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 697 (1975).
8. Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Evans v. DOT, 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1971).
9. Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp, 726 (N.D.
Cal. 1971). See generally Hulett, Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act, 27
ADM. L. REV. 275 (1975).
10. Clement Bros. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d
1027 (5th Cir. 1969).
11. See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); M.
SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1966); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
12. James Madison declared, "A popular government, without popular information,
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both." S. PADOvER, THE COMPLETE MADISON 377 (1953).
13. See generally Comment, National Security and the Public's Right to Know: A
New Role for the Courts Under the Freedom of Information Act, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1438 (1975).
14. The cases have been limited to information concerning diplomatic or military
secrets. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (investigatory report in
the custody of the Secretary of the Air Force held not discoverable); Totten v. United
States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (government contract executed during the Civil War
classified as privileged); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975) (classified CIA documents presumptively privileged);
Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963)
(investigatory report of Department of Air Force held confidential); Firth Sterling Steel
Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (navy drawings classified as
secret documents). In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the United States
Supreme Court held that the President's generalized interest in confidentiality, unsup-
ported by a need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets,
could not prevail over a specific judicial need for the documents. For a discussion of
this case see Berger, How the Privilege for Governmental Information Met Its
Watergate, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747 (1975); Van Alstyne, A Political Constitution-
al Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 116 (1974).
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criminal law context, for example, public disclosure of governmental activi-
ties regarding the detection and prosecution of criminal misconduct can
frustrate effective law enforcement in at least three ways. First, if individ-
uals engaging in prohibited conduct are cognizant of the time, place, and
method of future investigations, the criminal justice system would be under-
mined. 15 Second, criminal prosecutions are conducted in an adversary con-
text. Accordingly, the legislative and judicial branches have established
rules of confidentiality regarding records within the control of the state in
order to promote effective prosecution.' For this reason the Texas Attorney
General has ruled that the Texas Open Records Act should not serve as an
additional means of discovery in a criminal case. 17 Finally, the courts have
recognized that the state has an interest in preventing extensive press coverage
when such conduct may prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.' 8
Freedom of the Press. Since the historic case of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan'9 the courts have afforded the press a special legal status which
promotes the free flow of information to the public and enhances "uninhib-
ited, robust and wide open" debate of national issues.20  The Court has
been less helpful with the specific right of "newsgathering." In Branzburg
15. The curtain of secrecy can be lifted after investigations are completed. At that
point in time the legality of governmental intrusion would be governed by the fourth
amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. In Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court ruled that the fourth amendment applied in all
situations where the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See generally E.
FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1970); E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1975); J.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); Cleary, Recent
Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure, 1 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 21 (1975).
16. See, e.g., FED. R. CiuM. P. 16; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (1968).
As compared to the federal courts, a defendant in a Texas state court has a limited right
of discovery. Upon a showing of good cause pre-trial discovery is extended to state-
ments of the defendant and to all tangible items possessed by the state. Id. Depositions
may be conducted by the defendant as a matter of right at the examining trial or any
time upon good cause motion. Id. arts. 39.01-.02. The use of the depositions at the trial
is limited to impeachment, unless the witness is unavailable. Id. arts. 39.12-.13. It is
well established that the state's suppression of material evidence favorable to the defend-
ant violates due process. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Following direct
examination of government witnesses the accused has a right of access to all prior
statements made by that witness which are material to the trial. The defendant may also
inspect any document used before the jury in such a manner that its contents are at issue.
Gaskin v. State, 353 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962).
17. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 108 (Aug. 5, 1975); accord, Kerr v. United States
Dist. Ct., 511 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1975); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Cooney
v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Barceloneta Shoe
Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
18. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532(1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). In Sheppard the Court outlined the
types of constitutionally permissible restraints on the press, which included controlling
the number and the conduct of reporters in the courtroom and issuing protective orders
to proscribe statements made to the press.
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. For a treatment of the media's liability m defamation actions see Robertson,
Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54
TExAs L. REV. 199 (1976). See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 44 U.S.L.W. 4262 (U.S.
March 2, 1976), where the Court held that a news story involving the divorce of a
wealthy socialite involved neither a public figure nor a public event. Thus, liability did
not need to be predicated on malice. For a discussion of the media's liability in privacy
actions see Beytagh, Privacy and a Free Press: A Contemporary Conflict in Values, 20
N.Y.L.F. 453 (1975); Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court
Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 41 (1974).
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v. Hayes21 the Court recognized that "newsgathering" qualified for first
amendment protection but held the privilege did not apply when newsmen
were questioned before the grand jury concerning confidential sources. 22
A further blow to the press was struck in Pell v. Procunier23 when the Court
held that newsmen did not have a constitutional right of access to prisons or
prisoners beyond that afforded the general public. Despite these cases one
must not lose sight of the concept that a free press is an indispensable tool
in assuring the essence of democracy: an informed electorate. 24  This con-
cept applies with particular vigor within the framework of criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions which have consistently been classified by the courts
as events of public interest. 25 The media's reporting of such events, therefore,
should fall within first amendment protection. 26
Privacy. The common law tort of privacy was first introduced in a law
review article by Warren and Brandeis.2 7  This tort, as defined by Dean
Prosser, involved four separate torts: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of the plain-
tiff's name or likeness for the defendant's advantage 2  The intrusion29 and
appropriation3 0 branches of privacy have been expressly recognized in Texas.
21. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
22. id. In a concurring opinion Justice Powell stated that the case was limited to
grand jury testimony and that societal interests must be balanced on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 710.
23. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Pell involved a California Department of Corrections
regulation which prohibited prison interviews by reporters. The companion case, Saxbe
v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), involved a similar rule of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons.
24. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 75 (1960); J.
WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 66 (1974); Note, The Public's Right to Know: Pell v.
Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 829 (1975). The
press has had some success in gaining access to governmental records on constitutional
grounds. See, e.g., Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972);
Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972); cf. Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651
(D.D.C. 1959).
25. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (story of rape
and killing of plaintiff's daughter); Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div.-Meredith
Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (broadcast of plaintiff's arrest).
26. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Hill the Court ruled that
the states could not redress false reports of matters of public interest absent a showing
that the defendant published with knowledge of the report's falsity or in reckless
disregard of the truth. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the
Court rested its opinion on a narrower ground. The Court ruled that since the
defendant had obtained the identity of the rape victim from judicial records, which were
public documents, the disclosure was constitutionally protected. See generally A.
MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
27. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). This
view is now accepted in the vast majority of states. See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v.
Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964); Carey v. Statewide Fin. Co., 3 Conn.
Cir. 716, 223 A.2d 405 (1966); Carlson v. Dell Publishing Co., 65 Ill. App. 2d 209, 213
N.E.2d 39 (1965).
28. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 802-18 (4th ed. 1971).
29. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973), noted in 27 Sw. L.J. 865
(1973).
30. Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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The United States Supreme Court has held that privacy has federal constitu-
tional dimensions.3 ' In the criminal law arena a government's informant8 2
as well as a party being investigated or accused of criminal activity must
be accorded a right of privacy by the courts.
III. HOUSTON CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CO. V. CITY OF HOUSTON
The issue presented to the court of civil appeals was whether various
investigatory records were public information under the Texas Open Records
Act. The materials requested by the plaintiffs included offense reports,38
personal history and arrest records,34 police blotters,35 show-up sheets,30
and arrest sheets.37  On the effective date of the Texas Open Records Act
all of the documents sought were available to the media with the exception
of the police blotters.38 In January 1974, however, the city ceased to allow
the press access to certain offense reports.3 9 The Texas Attorney General
ruled that the name, address, and offense of each arrestee and the disposi-
31. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortions); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (eavesdropping); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
contraceptives). However, the Court has expressly stated that a person's general right
to privacy is the subject of state law. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
32. The underlying rationale of this privilege is that if informers' names were readily
available, such persons would be less likely to supply information to law enforcement
agencies. In most circumstances anonymity is essential to the continued usefulness of an
informant and to protect him from reprisals. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON ThE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 111 (2d ed. 1972); Comment, An Informer's Tale: Its Use
in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953). If the identity of
the informer becomes essential to a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused, the privilege ceases. In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), a
narcotics conviction was reversed based on the Government's refusal to reveal the
identity of an "informant." The "informant" had participated in the sale of the drugs
and might have provided relevant information regarding the defense of entrapment or the
Government's accusation that the defendant knowingly participated in the sale of illegal
goods. Thus, the party who sought protection was more than a mere informant.
Additionally, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), stands for the proposition that
the state does not violate due process or the right of confrontation by failing to reveal
the identity of an informant who merely provides facts to establish probable cause for
search and seizure. If the Government uses the informer as a witness at trial, however,
his true identity must be disclosed based on confrontation and cross-examination
principles. Harris v. United States, 371 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1967).
33. This report usually includes the offense committed, the location, identification
and description of the complainant, the time and place of the offense, any vehicles
involved, the identification and description of any witnesses, the weather, and the names
of investigating officers. Supplementary reports are often compiled which may include a
synopsis of confessions, officers' opinions regarding the investigation, informant's state-
ments, ballistics reports, fingerprint comparisons, and laboratory tests. 531 S.W.2d at
179.
34. These reports compile a chronological history of the arrests and criminal
activities of an individual. The reports also include the individual's name, race, sex,
alias, place and date of birth, physical description, marital status, occupation, relatives,
handwriting exemplar, fingerprints, palm prints, and past arrests. Id. at 179-80.
35. These reports include the same information as the personal history and arrest
record as well as details of the arrest. Id. at 180.
36. This document is maintained by the police during each twenty-four-hour period
to document each arrest made. It contains the arrestee's name and age, the place of
arrest, the arresting officer, and the modus operandi of the arrestee. Id.37. This record is similar to the show-up sheet in that it reflects the arrests made
each day and lists the name, race, and age of each suspect. Further, the place of the
arrest, the offense committed, and the names of the arresting officers are compiled. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 181.
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tion of each case should be released to the media. 40  According to the
opinion of the attorney general the city should cooperate with the press by
providing additional information concerning police activities as long as the
right of privacy of affected parties was preserved. 41 To comply with this
decision the city allowed the media access to the data but vigorously asserted
a right to withhold the information at any time.42
Justice Curtis Brown recognized that the resolution of the controversy
involved a careful weighing of conflicting societal interests. 43  The court
first held that the media and the public have a constitutionally protected
right of access to information concerning the detection and prosecution of
criminals. 44 This right of access, however, must be tempered by an equally
compelling need for government secrecy 45 and individual privacy. 46 Justice
Brown balanced these interests and expressed the view that the press should
have access to all arrest records, police blotters, and show-up sheets. 47 Pub-
lic access was limited, however, to only the front page of the offense reports
which included data such as the offense committed, the time and location of
the crime, and the identities of the complainant and investigating officers. 48
The court's conclusion was logical because a public event was involved and a
revelation of such limited facts, therefore, constituted only a minimal invasion
of privacy. 49 Further, public access to this information certainly would not
significantly retard state prosecution.
Other information contained in offense reports, such as statements by
informants, confessions, and officers' opinions regarding investigations, should
not under the court's holding be made available to the public. 50 The dis-
semination of this type of data might severely hamper future criminal prose-
cutions.5 Similarly, personal history and arrest records which generally
consist of an individual's past experiences within the criminal justice system
were also ruled confidential. 52 Justice Brown expressed the concern that
a contrary holding might result in "massive and unjustified damage to the
individual. '5 3  The court was undoubtedly correct in this judgment. Al-
though law enforcement agencies have an affirmative duty to collect all
information related to potential criminal activities, investigative reports can
unfortunately consist of hearsay, rumors, and other unreliable facts. As only
40. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 18A (March 25, 1974). Actually, this opinion
was issued to clarify OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 18 (Jan. 15, 1974) which held that
the information sought was protected from public disclosure under the Texas Open
Records Act because it constituted arrest records dealing with the detection and investi-
gation of crime.
41. OPEN RECORDS DECISION No. 18A (March 25, 1974).
42. 531 S.W.2d at 181.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 186.
45. Id.; see notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text.
46. Id. at 188; see notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
47. Id. at 185.
48. Id. at 186-87.
49. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
50. 531 S.W.2d at 187.
51. Id.




limited efforts have been made to expunge or correct inaccurate data in
investigatory files, 54 grave injury would be inflicted upon an individual's
reputation by allowing public disclosure of this type of material. The public
often places an unquestioned credence upon information contained in an of-
ficial public document.
IV. CONCLUSION
Houston Chronical Publishing Co. v. City of Houston is an important
case in Texas jurisprudence. Justice Curtis Brown of the court of civil
appeals dealt with several complex and conflicting policy considerations.
In an excellent example of judicial scholarship Justice Brown balanced these
interests and ruled that the public had access to particular types of criminal
investigatory records.
J. Graham Hill
54. See, e.g., Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v. Mitchell,
430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally Comment, Expungment of Arrest
Records of Exonerated Arrestees, 16 S. TEx. L.J. 173 (1975).
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